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transportation. The complexity of the economic factors involved in the
tolerance problem calls for solution by the expert body.
Since tolerance regulations seem to be reasonable measures for ad-
justing losses caused by commodities which are by their nature inevitably
damaged in transportation, it may be desirable to make express provi-
sions for such regulations. The obvious solution is to amend § 20 (11)
of the Interstate Commerce Act so as to give the Commission the power
either (1) to construe the meaning of "inherent vice" so that it will have
uniform application in the courts in suits for loss or damage, or (2) as
suggested by one writer,62 to amend the act so as to allow the "Commis-
sion to provide tolerances when reasonably justified." The latter would
seem to be the better solution as it would best cover the complex eco-
nomic factors involved and allow the Commission greater discretion in
striking a balance between the interests of the shippers and carriers.
HARRIET D. HOLT.
Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over State
Courts
In the recent case of Naim v. Naim,' the United States Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal from the Supreme Court of Virginia because
the federal question was not presented in "clean-cut and concrete form." 2
The facts of the case were not in dispute. Suit was brought by
appellee, a white woman duly domiciled in Virginia. The appellant was
a non-resident Chinese. The parties left Virginia, married in North
Carolina, and returned immediately to Virginia. There they cohabited
as man and wife in direct contravention of the Virginia miscegenation
law which forbade their marriage.3 Both conceded that they left Vir-
ginia to marry for the purpose of evading this law. At the instigation
of the wife, the marriage was annulled by the Circuit Court of the City
of Portsmouth, and an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia was
based on the sole ground that the Virginia miscegenation statute was
unconstitutional because it contravened the due process and equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the decision of the lower court, expressly holding that
the Virginia statute in question was not repugnant to the federal con-
stitution.4 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the
62103 PENN. L. Rv. 113, 115 (1954).
197 Va. 80, 90 S. E. 2d 749 (1956); vacated and remanded 350 U. S. 891
(1956) ; reaff'd 197 Va. 734, 90 S. E. 2d 849 (1956) ; appeal dismissed 350 U. S.
985 (1956).
'Naim v. Naim, 350 U. S. 891 (1956).
'VA. CODE § 20-54 (1950). The Virginia miscegenation statute declares a mar-
riage between a white person and a person of any other race a nullity.
'Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 90 S. E. 2d 749 (1956).
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judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court was vacated and the case re-
manded to the Virginia Supreme Court to be returned to the Circuit
Court of the City of Portsmouth in order for the latter court to make
further findings of fact so that the case might present a constitutional
issue in "clean-cut and concrete form." 5 On remand, the Virginia Su-
preme Court rendered a further opinion 6 in which it declared that there
was no procedure for sending a cause back to the circuit court with
directions to rehear the case, gather additional evidence, and render a
new decision. It declared that the issues presented had been decided and
that the previous judgment annulling the marriage was again affirmed.
In a second appeal to the United States Supreme Court,1 it ruled that
the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in response to its original
order left the case devoid of a properly presented federal question and
consequently the case was dismissed. Apparently, therefore, the initial
decision of the Virginia Supreme Court constitutes a valid and binding
adjudication of the issues of this case.
Appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court over state
courts is derived from the United States Constitution, Art. III, §§1, 2;
which provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases and Con-
troversies arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and the Treaties made.., under their authority. ... In all other Cases
before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction,
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regula-
tions as the Congress shall make." (Emphasis added.) This provision
has been the basis for much controversy because it does not expressly
provide from what courts the Supreme Court may exercise appellate
jurisdiction. From 1815 to 1859 the Commonwealth of Virginia in two
cases-Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,8 Cohens v. Virginia--and the State
of Wisconsin in one case-Ableman v. Boothe'10 -directly challenged the
authority of the Supreme Court to review their decisions. With the
opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in the Hunter case as the keystone,
these cases apparently settled the matter by holding that "the appellate
power of the United States does extend to cases pending in the state
courts; and the ... judiciary act, which authorizes the exercise of this
jurisdiction in the specified cases, . . . is supported by the letter and
spirit of the Constitution."" Today the problem is not whether the
Supreme Court of the United States has appellate jurisdiction over state
'Naim v. Naim, supra note 2.
Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 734, 90 S. E. 2d 849 (1956).
7 Naim v. Naim, 350 U. S. 985 (1956).
8 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1815).
'6 Wheat. 264 (U. S. 1821).
1021 How. 506 (U. S. 1859).
M artin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 314 (U. S. 1815).
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decisions involving federal questions, but rather the extent to which this
power has been limited.
There are three sources of limitations of the Supreme Court's appel-
late jurisdiction over federal questions arising in state courts. They are:
(1) Express limitations in the Constitution-Constitutional limitations
are, primarily, (a) the necessity for a case or controversy, 1 2 and (b) the
case or controversy must involve the exercise of judicial power.13 Thus
the Court cannot decide moot,14 academic,' 5 or political questions. 16
(2) Statutory limitations-Congressional regulations for the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction are set out in 28 U. S. C. A. § 1257.17 From this
statute, the Supreme Court has formulated five well established rules:
(a) There must be a final judgment or decree' 8 (b) from the highest
court of the state in which a decision could be had. 19 (c) There must
be a federal question raised and the question must be substantial.2 0
(d) The federal question to be reviewed must be properly raised and
preserved in the state courts. 21 (e) There can be no review if the case
can be decided on an independent state ground.22
(3) Self-imposed limitations-The Supreme Court has formulated sev-
eral self-imposed limitations to control its own docket. These rules are
with but one exception outlined in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority23 and have been approved in many subsequent cases.2 4 Briefly
12 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227 (1936).
' Cohens v. Virginia, supra note 9.
14 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma, 303 U. S. 206 (1937).
15 Colgrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1945).
'0 Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578 (1942).
1? "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which
a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of
the United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state
on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specifically set up or claimed under the Constitution, trea-
ties, statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised by the United States.
1" Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120 (1944) ; Republic Natu-
ral Gas Co. v. Alabama, 334 U. S. 62 (1947).
1" Pope v. United States, 323 U. S. 1 (1944) ; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
v. Oklahoma, 303 U. S. 206 (1937).
" Patterson v. Stranolind Oil and Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376 (1939) ; Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma, 303 U. S. 206 (1937) ; Parker v. Duffy, 342 U. S.
33 (1951).
-" Osborne v. Clark, 204 U. S. 565 (1906) ; Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U. S. 253
(1943) ; Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1944).
22 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1 (1951) ; Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474
(1945).
23 297 U. S. 288, 346-48 (1935)
2' For example, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 328 (1935) ; Republic
Natural Gas Co. v. Alabama, 334 U. S. 62 (1947) ; Rescue Army v. Municipal
Court, 331 U. S. 549 (1946).
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enumerated, the rules are: The Court will not (a) pass upon the con-
stitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding; (b)
decide a constitutional question unless it is absolutely necessary to a de-
cision of the case; (c) formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied; (d) pass
upon a constitutional question presented by the record if there is another
ground the case can be decided upon; (e) pass upon the validity of a
statute upon complaint of one who has failed to show injury by its opera-
tion; and (f) pass upon the validity of a statute at the instance of one
who has availed himself of its benefits. (g) When the validity of an
act of Congress is drawn into question, and even if serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, the Court will first ascertain whether a con-
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided. (h) Rescue Army v. Municipal Court25 added a new self-
imposed rule which is probably the key to the Naim case-the court may
refuse to entertain jurisdiction in a constitutional case even on appeal
if it considers the record inadequate for a decision of the constitutional
issues. The Court has a broad discretion to determine what is "ade-
quate."
At first blush, the Naim case appears to be another instance of Su-
preme Court recognition of a state court evasion of a Supreme Court
mandate.26 - This seems to be true particularly in view of the fact that
there is no apparent defect in the record of the prerequisites enumerated
above and that the Supreme Court was not without remedy in such a
situation. There are at least two ways it could have contravened the
decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia. First, it might have used
the same device used in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,27 i.e., it could have
by-passed the Supreme Court of Virginia and remanded the case directly
to the Circuit Court of Portsmouth. This was done in the Martin case
to avoid further friction with the Virginia Supreme Court. Second, the
Supreme Court of the United States could have recalled the mandate
and decided the case on the facts before it. Since it chose to do neither,
the court evidently did not wish to decide the question involved at this
time and refrained from doing so by apparently exercising its discretion
as to what constitutes an adequate record. This it could do by applying
"331 U. S. 549 (1946).
.' State courts have at times asserted their independence by an evasion of Su-
preme Court mandates and the Supreme Court has recognized the legality of such
evasion in certain instances. In Davis v. Packard, 8 Pet. 312 (U. S. 1834), the
United States Supreme Court permitted its mandate to be avoided by the New
York Court when the latter court declared that under state law the appellate court's
jurisdiction did not permit a reversal of the trial court for a factual error not ap-
pearing on the record. See generally, note, State Court Evasion of Supreme Court
Mandates, 56 YALE L. J. 574 (1947).
'1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1815).
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the well established doctrine28 which permits the taking of jurisdiction
in the first instance in order to determine jurisdiction. The refusal of
the Virginia Court to make a further finding of fact left the Supreme
Court in the position to dismiss the case for lack of a federal question
since, theoretically, it never had one before it. This would be only a
reaffirmance of the doctrine invoked in the Rescue Army case and not a
recognition of an evasion of its mandate. It should be noted that such
a disposition of the case would not prejudice the constitutional questions
involved from being raised again in a subsequent case.
TED G. WEST.
Bills and Notes-Holder in Due Course-Finance Companies
In an era characterized by a phenomenal upward surge of retail in-
stallment purchasing," the comparative serenity of appellate litigation in
the field of negotiable instruments has been consistently interrupted by
cases arising out of financial credit arrangements. Such arrangements
consist of informal agreements, usually of long standing, between dealers
and finance companies whereby the latter purchases commercial paper
arising out of a sale to the consumer. The finance company usually sup-
plies the blank forms for notes and conditional sales contracts as well as
supervises, to varying degrees, the terms of credit. The question is thus
presented: Do such credit arrangements cause the finance company to
become an active participator in the sale to the consumer so as to pre-
clude it from being a holder in due course of the transferred paper?
Notwithstanding the fact that the Negotiable Instruments Law sets
out precise standards2 for the determination of this question, several
jurisdictions have judicially effected other criteria which, upon applica-
tion to these credit arrangements, have denied the finance company the
protection afforded a holder in due course.3 In a recent case of first
2' "Whether the statutory requirements (for appellate review) have been met is
itself a federal question." Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14, 16 (1936).
' Installment credit reached an estimated total of $1,593,000,000 for the year
ending March 31, 1955. This figure represents credit extended only for the pur-
chase of consumer goods secured by the items purchased, title being held either by
the retail outlets or financial institutions. 39 CONsuMER FINANCE NEWS no. 12,
p. 31 (1955).
2 N. I. L. § 52: "A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument
under the following conditions: . . . (3) that he took it in good faith for value;
(4) that at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it."
N. I. L. § 56: "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated
must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
' Such results are reached on the basis that when the finance company and dealer
engage in preconceived credit arrangements, the company, which is better able to
bear the risk of loss than the hard pressed consumer, has become a party to the
original transaction and is subject to defenses available against the dealer. See
[Vol. 34
